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APPRENTICESHIP IN EARLY MODERN VENICE1 
 
The desire of the Republican state to regulate the production and sale of food led to the 
establishment, during the twelfth century, of the Giustizia Vecchia, a magistracy which later 
developed an authority over the majority of the city’s guilds. The further decision to set a public 
register of contracts of apprenticeship reflects the ambition of Venetian authorities to regulate 
and control both vocational training and access to the urban job market, acting as a guarantor 
between masters and young apprentices. This chapter presents an historical overview of 
apprenticeship in early modern Venice, examining the development of the city’s legislation on 
the matter, and analysing a new sample of contracts recorded in the city’s apprenticeship 
registers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In particular, we discuss the complex 
relationship between the general legal framework established by Venetian public authorities 
and the particular set of norms detailed in guilds statutes.2  
Our analysis reveals that apprenticeship contracts were used to accommodate a variety of 
situations, including paying for intense training to masked working contracts, while following 
the general framework provided by state and guild regulations. We then present an in-depth 
study of apprenticeship contracts from three crafts (goldsmiths, carpenters and printers), 
chosen for their economic importance, and because they possibly represented different realities 
in terms of technological specialization, capital (or labour) intensiveness and typology of 
market. This highlights yet another aspect of apprenticeship in Venice: the influence of guilds. 
Some guilds such as the Goldsmiths, were more closed to foreigners, favouring Venetians 
instead. Apprenticeship in early modern Venice is an institution which, despite appearing as 
highly regulated and formalized, accommodated a variety of realities with remarkable 
																																								 																				
1	Under review as part of an edited volume on European early modern apprenticeship, for the types of the 
Cambridge University Press. The chapter is the result of a collaborative work, and it is part of the research project 
GAWS (Garzoni: Apprenticeship, Work, Society), funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR, 
France) and the Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche (FNS), in collaboration with the universities of Lille3 
(resp. Valentina Sapienza), Rouen Normandie (resp. Anna Bellavitis) and the École Polytechnque Fédérale de 
Lausanne (resp. Frédéric Kaplan). For more information see http://garzoni.hypotheses.org.	
2 Previous research on apprenticeship in early modern Venice focuses on institutions (e.g. Lazzarini, 1929; 
Costantini, 1987 and 1990), specific crafts (e.g. Vianello, 1993; Trivellato, 2000; Della Valentina, 2006), or its 
relationship to the economic decline of Venice during the seventeenth century.	
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flexibility. 
 
Part 1: The institutional and historical framework 
 
Apprenticeship in Italian cities was diverse in its structure and functions, and its edges 
were blurred. The variety of lengths, salaries and clauses that are found in apprenticeship 
contracts reflected the craft, the age and gender of the apprentice, and also on the relationship 
between the master and the apprentice or his/her family. As has been pointed out, the 
registration of a contract was not necessarily the beginning of a work relationship between two 
actors who did not have any previous social or economic relationship. It was sometimes the 
conclusion of a probationary period, during which masters tested the apprentices’ (Curatolo, 
1997; Caracausi, 2016; Maitte, 2017). Once an apprentice, a boy or girl was involved in several 
activities; he or she had to learn the trade, work, and take part in the more general family life 
of the master. Domestic tasks were commonly expected of apprentices, especially girls, but 
other activities, ranging from selling in the shop to helping with the harvest are also mentioned 
in contracts (Sciarrotta, 2012; Klapisch-Zuber, 2016).  
A recent study has shown that fewer than half of Italian guilds, in all kind of crafts, had 
specific rules on apprenticeship (Mocarelli, 2008). Guilds’ rules and apprenticeship contracts 
give very little information about what was actually taught to an apprentice or what they needed 
to know in order to become a member of a guild. This has certainly a lot to do with the 
‘mysteries’ and the secrets of the crafts, but also with the continuous evolution of standards 
and quality requirements that was necessary in order to deal with competition. As pointed out 
by Mocarelli (2008), in several Italian cities “apprenticeships were not officially recognized. 
However, that does not necessarily mean they were non-existent. In various cases, in fact, it 
has been possible to discover that increasingly a private contract between the parties was 
adopted”. Nevertheless, regulations of the apprenticeship can be found in the most important 
Italian manufacturing centres, resulting in a variety of different legal frameworks. 
The variety of contract terms also affected the methods of payment – sometimes 
apprenticeship contracts were used to provide similar conditions to those given to journeymen. 
Even when it came closest, like in the great industrial cities of the Italian Renaissance – 
Florence, Milan or Venice – and especially so in the textile industry, where apprentices did not 
commonly pay a premium to the master but received instead a salario (literally a salary, but in 
most cases it was a payment) at the end of the contract, the use of an apprenticeship contract 
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entailed an institutional distinction with journeymen. In most cases, when compared to the 
salaries received by the journeymen in the same craft, those ‘apprenticeship salaries’ seem 
almost symbolic: for example, in the wool industry of Florence, apprentices were paid not more 
than 15 liras per year, when the average annual salary of a journeyman was about 500 liras 
(Marcello, 1993). On one side this payment can be considered an incentive to complete the 
contract, but on the other it sometimes results in sums that confirm the idea that apprentices 
could constitute a less expensive labour force and/or compensate a possible scarcity of waged 
workers. 
Over the variety of rules, another element of difficulty is given by the endpoint and 
language of apprenticeship, often vaguer than we might expect. Not only should the career 
trajectory from apprentice to journeyman to master not be taken for granted, but the real 
meaning of the words used to designate those stages is a subject of discussion among historians 
(Martinat, 2017). Masters could head a workshop, with journeymen and apprentices under their 
authority, but they could also be under someone else’s authority. In some crafts, this distinction 
was captured by different words: ‘chief-masters’ (capo maestro) were the head of the workshop 
while ‘masters’ (maestro) had passed the masters’ examination, but did not have a workshop 
on their own (Molà, 2000; Della Valentina, 2003). On the other hand, a crucial ambiguity 
sometimes existed in the language used for apprentices and waged workers: the junior 
personnel called ‘garzoni’ could either be apprentices or salaried workers (Caracausi, 2008). 
This was not always the case. Sometimes complexity went in the other direction. In the 
Venetian glass industry two words, garzonetto and garzone designated two separate steps in 
the apprenticeship process: in the former case, the apprentice was younger and not trained in 
glass-blowing (Maitte, 2017).  
We concentrate here on apprenticeships by individual masters and apprentices. 
However, apprenticeship in charity institutions was also widespread across Europe. In early 
modern Italy, institutions that provided an education and a dowry to poor girls were particularly 
important (Groppi, 1998). The development of the possibility for girls to leave their family 
home to become apprentices or servants is a subject of debate among historians, and has even 
been offered as an explanation for the so-called “little divergence” between Northern and 
Southern Europe (De Moore and Van Zanden, 2010). We shall not enter this debate here, but 
we will emphasise some simple facts: as part of the guild system, apprenticeship was much 
more accessible for boys, while domestic service was one of the most widespread activities for 
young women. Yet, the boundaries between domestic service and apprenticeship were often 
less clear that we imagine (Bellavitis, 2016).  
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1.1. The Institutions of Apprenticeship in Venice 
 
The existence in Venice of a specific court charged with the recording of 
apprenticeship’s contracts for the majority of guilds, albeit not all of them, is an exceptional 
opportunity for historians. The Giustizia Vecchia supervised the activity of all guilds, except 
for the wool sector that was under the authority of the Provveditori di Comun and the silk sector 
that was under the authority of the Provvediori di Comun and the Consoli dei Mercanti. After 
1291, Venetian master craftsmen had to inform the Giustizia Vecchia about any apprentices in 
their workshops. The aim of this rule was to protect apprentices from abuse by their masters, 
and to safeguard masters from misbehaviour of their apprentices. The master was obliged to 
record the accordo (agreement) with the apprentice in a book of the Giustizia Vecchia; 
sometimes this agreement could be preceded by a written contract (cum carta) before a notary. 
The main task of this magistracy was to check whether the length of the agreement respected 
the norms of the guild’s statute; it could also change the level of the salary and sometimes 
impose a tax on the agreement.4  
During the same period, a major evolution was occurring in the organization of the 
Venetian Republic: the progressive exclusion of artisans from political power and the 
concentration of political decision-making in the hands of the mercantile elite, the so-called 
“patriciate”. This culminated in the reform of the Great Council that started in 1298 (1297 
according to the Venetian calendar) and its main constitutional consequence was the hereditary 
right of the membership of the Great Council and the exclusion of everyone else. The reformed 
Council came therefore at the centre of the Venetian political life; in fact, it elected the Doge 
and the members of all the most important institutional bodies, among which the Guistizia 
Vecchia. The imposition of State controls over work relations can be seen as part of this 
process. Formally the statutes of the guilds had to be approved by the Giustizia Vecchia; in 
other worlds, even if the guild laws were passed by the assembly of their members, only after 
the approbation of the Giustizieri they obtained the same legal effectiveness of the State laws. 
Therefore, in case of disputes between artisans – also regarding apprenticeship the Giustizia 
Vecchia was the court that had to judge. 
In 1396, the Giustizia Vecchia passed a law requiring the registration of apprenticeship 
contracts before its officers. The main difference from the earlier registration system was the 
																																								 																				
4 State Archive of Venice (ASVe), Compilazione Leggi (CL), b. 49, March 10th 1396 and Lazzarini, 1929, p. 885. 
5	
	
explicit prohibition to sign contracts before a notary. The reason given for this law was that 
apprentices were being forced to sign another, less favourable contract, in front of a public 
notary or the Capi di Sestiere, the magistrates that supervised domestic service.5 The same law 
was recalled in 1444; probably this norm was hardly enforced and the Giustizieri had to specify 
again the same prohibition and fixed a penalty of 100 lire for offenders. It is interesting to 
consider this law in light of one from a few years earlier, in 1440, which specified that domestic 
service contracts with merchants and artisans were to be registered at the Giustizia Vecchia, 
while those with patricians and Venetian citizens were to be registered with the Capi di 
Sestiere. The fact that servants in artisans and merchants’ houses also took part in the economic 
activities of their masters is clearly the reason for this distinction, which also raises the problem 
of the exploitation of workforce as, in theory, a servant was a worker who was not being taught 
a trade, while an apprentice was learning a craft, and aspiring to a career in the guild. Moreover, 
under the new laws, masters were obliged to hire apprentices who were older than a certain age 
– provided by the guild’s statute – and to ensure they received adequate living and working 
conditions. Forty years later, the Giustizieri passed another law requiring the recording of both 
apprentices hired for a “long time” (“garzoni … accordati per lungo tempo”) and those hired 
yearly. At the end of the fifteenth century, Venetian master craftsmen were required to register 
any apprentices hired for a period longer than one month. (Lazzarini, 1929, p. 889).   
The surviving records of the Giustizia Vecchia cover the period 1575-1772, with some 
lacunae.6 The number of contracts slightly exceeds 53,000 and includes only apprenticeship 
agreements; the Giustizia Vecchia in fact did not register journeymen, even if some guilds used 
to record also their journeymen separately. Three of the most prominent guilds of the city, the 
silk weavers, the wool producers and the Murano glass makers, were under the control of other 
magistrates, as was the most important state industry, the Arsenal: their contracts were not 
registered at the Giustizia Vecchia, as was the case for everyone else.7 During the period 1586-
1624 the population of Venice fell from 148,637 to 141,625 (Beltrami 1954, p. 38). Given that 
during the 1590s, around one thousand contracts a year were recorded by the Giustizia Vecchia, 
																																								 																				
5 ASVe, CL, b. 49, March 10th 1396 and Lazzarini, 1929, pp. 885-6. 
6 ASVe, Giustizia Vecchia (GV), b. 112, r. 151 (1575-6), 152 (1582-3); b. 113, r. 153.1 (1583-4), 153.2 (1584-5), 
154 (1591-2); b. 114, r. 155 (1592-3), 156 (1594-5); b. 115, r. 157 (1596-7), 158 (1597-8); b. 116, r. 159 (1598-
99), 160 (1606-7); b. 117, r. 161 (1609-10), 162 (1620-21); b. 118, r. 163 (1621-22), 164 (1625-27); b. 119, r. 165 
(1632-33), 166 (1642-44); b. 120, r. 167 (1644-46), 168 (1646-48); b. 121, r. 169 (1653-4), 170 (1656-58); b. 122, 
r. 171 (1658-60), 172 (1662-4); b. 123, r. 173 (1664-5), 174 (1669-71); b. 124, r. 175 (1681-82), 176 (1703-7), 
177 (1707-10); b. 125, r. 178 (1710-3), 179 (1713-8), 180 (1724-36); b. 126, r. 181 (1736-51), 182 (1766-72) 
7 The silk sector was under the supervision of the magistracies of the Consoli dei Mercanti and the Provveditori 
di Comun, while the glass sector under the authority of the Podestà di Murano. 
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apprentices in the guilds it covered represented less than 1.5 percent of the population.8 Clearly 
this is just a rough approximation, but it underlines the fact that apprenticeship was not as 
widespread a means for education and training as it was in England, for example. Instead, in 
Venice apprenticeship was, at least from an institutional point of view, strictly linked to the 
crafts and regulated by guilds and the state. This contrast was already noted in 1498 by the 
Venetian ambassador in London, in some critical remarks on the English system of education. 
He wrote that English parents did not love their children, because at the age of seven or eight 
they sent them as servants in someone else’s house for seven or nine years calling them 
aprendizi, and very few were rich enough to be exempted from this destiny (Bellavitis, 2012). 
Interestingly, the expression used in the Giustizia Vecchia registers is not contract 
(contratto), but accordo, whose literal translation would be agreement. According to Ferro 
(1845, ad vocem), the contract is an “pact made between two or more people, with which one 
of the parties, or set each of them is obliged to give or do something, or agrees to give or third 
do something”, while the agreement is a “consensus […] between two parties, who are 
contending” and generally it is an out of court settlement whose main purpose is to find a 
solution to a conflict without proceeding in court. 
 
Figure 1: Accordo between Baldissera de Zuanantonio (apprentice) and Francesco de 
Philippo (master). ASVe, GV, b. 112, r. 151, June 23th 15759. 
 
 
																																								 																				
8 In 1592, 984 contracts were registered, whose average length was 5 years; to proxy the number of garzoni in 
Venice during the period 1592-97 we summed the number of registrations for each year. Other contracts have 
been recorded in a less systematic way by other magistrates or by notaries: research on these sources is still in 
progress.  
9 “Baldissera de Zuanantonio Barcharol [al] presente de età de annj / 8 jn circa se scrive a star et lavorare al arte 
de depentor da casse con messer Francesco Philippo pittor a San Biagio per anni otto principianti adi primo Zugno 
infrascritto et sel falara alcun zorno sii obligato reffar, qual patron si offrisse insegnarli l’arte sua, li da per suo 
salario ducati vintj a spese e vestir di Baldissera”: Baldissera de Zuanantonio boatman, now about 8 y.o., registers 
to work as depentor da casse and to stay with messer Francesco de Philippo painter in San Biagio for eight years, 
starting from next June 1st and if he will lose any day, he is obliged to recover it, and the master will teach him 
his trade, and he gives him a salary of 20 ducats and the apprentice has to buy his clothes. 
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According to the formula set out in the law, the contracting parties were the apprentice, 
most of the time underage, and the master (an example is given in Figure 1). The name of a 
guarantor, who usually was the father or the widowed mother of the apprentice, was not always 
registered. The accordo contains two sets of mutual obligations: the master commits to teach 
their trade and to provide the apprentice with adequate living conditions (and sometimes a 
salary); the apprentice commits to remain with and work for their master for the whole period 
of the contract; sometimes other more specific obligations are also mentioned, such as clothing 
and other expenses. From a legal perspective, the agreements registered at the Giustizia 
Vecchia were not exactly contracts in their own right – which in Venice needed to be 
undertaken by two persons of age, fully accountable for their acts, in the presence of witnesses.  
Although the basic structure of the agreements recorded by the Giustizia Vecchia did 
not vary over the two centuries for which the registers survive, some of the content changed. 
In particular, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, contracts include a more specific 
description of obligations and financial conditions, for example noting when salaries change 
over the duration of the contract. These are more difficult to find in the eighteenth century.  
 
These contracts were registered in Venice; they are not as such representative of the 
whole Republic. However, a great number of apprentices came to Venice from the Venetian 
Mainland and some came from foreign territories. They therefore can help us to understand 
migration flows to Venice, its role as a training hub for its subject territories, and the 
organization and professional specialization of non-Venetian communities. 
 Apprenticeship contracts still had to respect the rules established by each guild. The 
statutes of Venetian guilds are more detailed for apprenticeship than in many other Italian 
cities. The majority of them were first established in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
and were adapted and modified over time. In 1519, the Council of Ten instituted a special 
magistracy, the Cinque Savi sopra le Mariegole, with the task of revising all guild statutes “for 
the good of our Venetians and of our city”.10 The Senate passed numerous laws, often at the 
request of individual guilds, to regulate apprenticeship in particular crafts. The rules of the 
Venetian crafts were complex and changeable, mainly concerning the duration of contracts, 
apprentices’ starting ages, the numbers of apprentices masters could take, and exams for 
journeymen to become masters. For example, the Silk and Gold Weavers set the minimum 
length of apprenticeships at four years, while the Mirror Makers required five years; the statutes 
																																								 																				
10 ASVe, Provveditori di Comun, b. 1, Capitolare, f. 235, October 13th 1519, in the Council of Ten. 
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of the Glass Makers did not mention duration, but set a minimum age of apprenticeship at 
fourteen years. The statute of Mirror Makers specified the exam and “masterpiece” that had to 
be made to become a journeyman and a master, while the  Silk and Gold Weavers imposed an 
exam only to become masters. The Mattress Makers demanded apprenticeships lasting two 
years. The Fustian Makers expected six years, but reduced this to two years at the end of the 
sixteenth century.11 The Goldsmiths’ statutes did not specify the length of the apprenticeship, 
but instead stated that seven years had to pass between the beginning of apprenticeship and the 
exam to become a master: after the end of his apprenticeship, a young man could work in a 
goldsmith’s shop, waiting to sit the mastership exam (Fiorucci, 2017).  
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Cap Makers required a new master to 
have served as an apprentice for four years and as a journeyman for two, to be older than 
twenty, to pay taxes and entry fees, and to pass the exam.12 In 1623 the Dyers’ Guild forbade 
contracts with apprentices older than eighteen; the limit imposed by the Bricklayers’ Guild was 
twenty, and twenty-five in the Boatmen’s Guild (Lazzarini 1929). 
The main goals of the authorities and guilds alike were achieving an equilibrium 
between supply and demand in the workforce, and ensuring an adequate level of employment 
for the urban population. When the population drastically declined because of the plagues, the 
Senate passed new laws to attract skilled artisans from the mainland and abroad. For example, 
from 1577 to 1580 and from 1631 to 1636, foreign masters only had to pay taxes and guild 
fees, and were exempted from requirements to serve in Venice as apprentices and 
journeymen.13 These measures caused frequent conflicts between Venetians and foreigners: in 
1577, the magistrates supervising the guilds’ statutes (Cinque Savi sopra le mariegole) 
punished those who threatened or used violence against foreign journeymen and masters 
working in Venice.14  
The openness of Venetian guilds varied according to economic circumstances. In the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, some guilds, such as the Silk Weavers and Wool Weavers, 
excluded foreigners, or required them to attain Venetian citizenship in order to become 
members and, especially, officers of the guild. However, it seems that it was only the 
Goldsmiths’ guild that had always, since the Middle Ages, had different rules for Venetians 
and foreigners (Mozzato, 2002; Rauch, 2009; Perez, 2017). Guilds became increasingly closed 
																																								 																				
11 ASVe, CL, b. 50, January 23rd 1512. 
12 ASVe, CL, b. 50, July 16th 1506. 
13 ASVe, CL, b. 51, March 4th 1577, January 8th 1577, and b. 53 January 30th 1630, June 17th 1634. 
14 ASVe, CL, b. 51, July 12th 1577. 
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to foreigners during the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the crisis of the Venetian 
economy. Laws passed at the start of the century were relatively permissive. For example, a 
1719 law established that in those guilds that “have already been opened admitting subjects 
and foreigners”, someone who had learned the art in another city, in the Venetian State or 
abroad, and who did not have the capital to open a workshop as a “chief master”, could pay 
just the admission tax that was paid by workers. However, by the 1760s, the focus had changed. 
A law passed in 1767 restricted access to apprenticeship in many guilds according to the origins 
of the candidates. Apprentices in many food retailing guilds, and also, ironically, in the German 
Gold Beaters’ Guild, now had to be from the city of Venice. In other guilds, for example the 
Shoemakers and the Carpenters, apprentices could be Venetian natives or subjects of the State; 
their masters had to show the guilds’ officers their apprentices’ baptismal certificates.15 Other 
regulations passed in 1767 and 1768 also tried to protect the Venetian labour force. In response 
to the crisis of the Venetian economy, the guilds were divided in three groups: guilds for those 
born in Venice; guilds for those born in Venice or the Venetian mainland; and guilds open to 
Venetians and foreigners.16 
The complex formal norms introduced in Venice to regulate apprenticeship were not 
always fully enforced. Several laws passed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
responded to failures to enforce the laws of apprenticeship. According to a report of the 
Inquisitorato alle Arti, at the end of the eighteenth century more than 300 apprentices in 35 
guilds were not registered; some had been working for their master for more than three years.17 
The degree to which the laws of apprenticeship were enforced is still debated; it is clear that 
several regulations were widely ignored, especially in the eighteenth century. Guilds monitored 
apprenticeship, but needed the intervention of the Giustizia Vecchia to enforce their 
regulations. Usually, the magistracy simply passed new laws to increase the penalties for 
violating rules, rather than spending greater effort on seeing that rules were followed. The 
apprenticeship system thus became less and less effective during the last century of the 
Republic, as Venetian urban manufacturing, with a few exceptions, shrank, and new industries 
outside of the guilds grew on the mainland. 
 
Part 2: Apprentices in Venice 
 
																																								 																				
15 ASVe, CL, b. 59, f. 833, April, 19th 1721; f. 1009, September, 12th 1767. 
16 ASVe, IA, b. 2, after 1771. 
17 ASVe, IA, b. 2, no date but end of the eighteenth century. 
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We consider here a sample of contracts of apprenticeship registered at the Giustizia 
Vecchia. Our dataset includes 5,962 contracts18, selected to represent specific trades over three 
periods: the end of the sixteenth century (2,474 contracts, from 1582 to 1598), which was a 
period of renewed prosperity and demographic growth after the 1576-77 plague;  the early 
seventeenth century, when Venice was struck again by a major epidemic outbreak (1,099 
contracts, from 1621 to 1633); and the middle of the seventeenth century (2,389 contracts, from 
1640 to 1665, plus a few later contracts), when the decline of the Venetian economy had 
commenced. Our sample covers a selection of trades in several sectors: luxury and fashion 
(jewellers, gold beaters, tailors, shoemakers and mercers), art, architecture and furniture 
(painters, stonecutters, carpenters, glass makers) and printing. The detailed list of trades we 
consider is given in the Appendix (Table 7). The selection of trades is motivated by the focus 
of the first phase of our project on activity sectors related, directly or indirectly, to fine, luxury 
and artistic goods. However, in order provide a complete picture of highest number of guilds 
and provide a comparison between them, the research focused only on the cited industries, 
while other important and numerous sectors were excluded, among which transportation and 
textile manufacturing, a major activity in Venice, and one of the few in which girls were 
apprenticed. In part as a consequence, in our dataset only 11 apprentices and 59 masters are 
female. 
By sampling data from three periods, we can identify the stability of the terms of 
contracts. It has been suggested that during prolonged periods of crisis, even if many masters 
were unemployed, there was not the general collapse in the number of apprentices that could 
have been expected. Apprentices were instead possibly used as an unskilled labour force and 
were more rarely trained as demanded by legislation. As a consequence, during this period of 
crisis, apprenticeship contracts did not only organize the transmission of skills and the 
formation of human capital, they were also a means to control and exploit the workforce (Rapp, 
1976 and Pezzolo, 2003 for the specific case of the crisis of the printing press sector). 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of contracts per year, for the three periods (left to right). The sample 
mainly accounts for the end of the sixteenth century, the 1620s and the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century. In red/grey the contracts with a salary paid by the master to the apprentice. 
Above each bin, the count of contracts for that year is given. 
																																								 																				
18 An original sample of 6,117 contracts has been trimmed of contracts without an explicit date of registration 
(18) or with the use of foreign currency for payments, instead of Venetian ducats (137), resulting in the final count 
of 5,962. The contracts come from the following records: ASVe, GV, Accordi dei Garzoni, b. 112, r. 152; b. 113, 
r. 153-4; b. 114, r. 155-6; b. 115, r. 157-8; b. 118, r. 163-4; b. 119, r. 165-6; b. 120, r. 167-8; b. 121, r. 169-70; b. 
123, r. 173. 
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To ease comparison, we group occupations into a hierarchy. An activity sector is a 
group of occupations which, broadly speaking, relate to the production or sale of similar goods 
or services and/or use similar materials. An occupation or trade is a recognised activity within 
a sector. A specialization is an identifiable sub-group within an occupation. Sometimes 
classification at the occupation and specialization levels is difficult and somewhat arbitrary, 
thus we mainly focus on activity sectors here. A guild in Venice usually contained the masters 
of a single occupation or even specialization, as was the case in many textile guilds, but could 
sometimes cover an activity sector, or even multiple occupations and sectors. This was the case 
for the guild of printers and booksellers, which included all activities involved in the production 
and distribution of books, and was organised in this way to sustain censorship as well as for 
the purpose of market control. The registers usually state both the occupation of the master and 
the specialization or occupation of the apprentice. A master printer might register apprentices 
in specific specializations, for example as workers at the press. Some contracts mention 
multiple specializations for the apprentice or master. In these relatively rare cases, it is difficult 
to know how the training and work of the apprentice was going to be distributed, thus we 
exclude these contracts in what follows. The most important guilds and activity sectors in our 
sample are relatively stable across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, aside from two 
notable exceptions: printers, who virtually disappeared during the seventeenth century, and 
mirror makers, a new occupation which in a few decades became the most common craft in 
our sample.  
 
2.1 Who became apprentices? 
 
Despite its importance with respect to the general economy of the Republic, especially 
during the sixteenth century, Venice cannot be considered as an obvious hub for entrance into 
an occupation. Several cities in the Venetian dominions possessed thriving economies with 
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their own guilds and apprenticeship systems. Examples include Padua, Vicenza, Verona, 
Bergamo and Brescia, among others. Yet it is undeniable that Venice gave access to a wider 
market, and was always in need for workers. The role of Venice in this respect depended on 
economic circumstances, notable among them the crisis of the seventeenth century, which may 
have reduced the importance of the capital with respect to the mainland (Lanaro 2008, p. 32) 
Signs of this long-term trend are apparent in the increasing share of Venetians among 
the city’s apprentices (Table 1) from 34% to 44%, yet a complementary explanation is also the 
opening of the market to foreign workers after the plague of 1630-31, and for a period of six 
years, likely causing a drop in their registration at the Giustizia Vecchia. This explanation 
cannot thus cover our third period, from 1640 onwards, when Venetians keep being more than 
at the end of the sixteenth century. Nonetheless, Venetians never exceeded half of registered 
apprentices, showing how much immigration there actually was in the city. Figure 3 illustrates 
the origins of Venetian apprentices at the European level. Despite Venice attracting some 
Spaniards, Germans, Frenchmen and Italians, the bulk of new apprentices came from Venice’s 
own mainland. In general, all the main areas of the Venetian mainland were well represented, 
running from west to east: Bergamo, Brescia, Verona, Vicenza and Padua, Treviso, the 
Bellunese area and Friuli. Noteworthy, also are the Grisons and Milan.  
 
Figure 3: The origins of Venetian apprentices. 
 
The pattern of migration into apprenticeships in Venice changes between the late 
sixteenth and mid seventeenth centuries, as can be seen in Figures 4a to 4c. During the late 
sixteenth century, Venice was still the main hub of the state, a position it gradually lost during 
the seventeenth century. The importance of Venice had dropped sharply in the 1620s and 
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1630s. By the 1640s to 1660s, Venice was attracting immigrants from nearby surrounding 
cities and countryside, or from the more underdeveloped areas of its territory, such as the Friuli, 
rather than the metropolitan centres in the western parts of the mainland. 
 
Figure 4a: Apprentices, 1582-1598    
 
Figure 4b: Apprentices, 1621-1633 
 
Figure 4c: Apprentices, 1640-1665 
 
Note: The size of the circles is proportional to the logarithm of the number of apprentices from 
that place. Longitude and latitude coordinates have been approximated to second digit 
precision. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of some variables part of the dataset. “f.d.” stands for father 
deceased. The last for rows account for the proportion of times the master was responsible to 
provide for the given contractual condition. 
 All 1582-1598 1621-1633 1640-1665 
Age (years) 14.4 14.4 14.7 14.4 
Length (years) 5.1 5.2 5.1 5 
Gender (males) 99.8% 99.6% 100% 99.9% 
Fem. guarantor 5.1% 6.8% 4.9% 3.3% 
Venetians 40.6% 34.6% 44.7% 44.9% 
Father deceased 36.3% 38.2% 42.9% 31.4% 
Venetians f.d. 32% 35.1% 34.8% 28.3% 
Foreigners f.d. 39.3% 39.8% 49.3% 34% 
Accommodation 75.3% 72.6% 70.9% 80.1% 
Personal care 69.7% 72.5% 67.8% 67.6% 
Expenses 75.5% 72.3% 71.8% 80.1% 
Clothes 16.9% 20.4% 12% 15.4% 
  
Previous studies showed that apprentices in Venice on average started apprenticeships 
at age fourteen, or nearby, and that the majority of contracts lasted four to six years, meaning 
apprentices finished their contract at around eighteen to twenty years old. There were some 
exceptional younger apprentices, but fewer older ones, who can be linked to unusual behaviour, 
such as the registration of very mature “apprentices” seeking to meet the minimum 
requirements for mastership (Lazzarini, 1929, pp. 877-8). Our data support these previous 
findings. Both the age of apprentices and the length of their contracts were stable over time, 
and normally distributed (minus outliers). In general, the age at entry affected the length of the 
contract. Older apprentices tended to have shorter contracts and vice-versa, even if there were 
some notable exceptions (Bellavitis, 2006). For example, the 1,884 apprentices who were older 
than fifteen years entered contracts that on average lasted for four years, whilst the contracts 
of the 240 apprentices who were older than twenty-five years, lasted something more than three 
years on average. On the other hand, the 1,574 apprentices younger than thirteen years were 
apprenticed for six years, on average.  
Although apprenticeships for older apprentices were usually shorter, they were not 
below the minimum duration necessary under the guilds’ rules. In general, most contracts were 
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designed to finish when the apprentice was around an age of nineteen years, while still 
respecting the minimum requirements given by the respective guild. However, a still 
considerable number of contracts did not meet the minimum term established by guild 
regulations, which was usually in between four to six years. While perhaps not surprising in 
itself, as internal regulations could easily be overlooked, this disregard for guild requirements 
indicates that a share of apprenticeships were not expected to lead to entry into the occupation 
as a journeymen or master. These masters were possibly just using apprenticeships as a form 
of labour contract. 
 
Figure 5: Histograms of the age at entry and length of contracts. We trim 246 contracts where 
the apprentice was aged 25 years or more. 
 
 
Masters in different occupations had specific preference for apprentices with certain 
common characteristics, or occupational profiles, which include their age at entry (Colavizza, 
2017). This preference was not only shared within occupations, but was stable over time. Some 
occupations recruited older apprentices, for example mirror makers or press workers in a print 
shop, while others usually recruited younger apprentices, such as goldsmiths or stonecutters. It 
is difficult to say at this stage why this was so, as these activities did not obviously have 
commonalities in terms of the strength required, the geographical origins of the apprentices, or 
the degrees of specialization involved.  
Apprenticeship was also part of the system for welfare and poor relief. A substantial 
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proportion of apprentices in fact had deceased fathers, as Table 1 shows, although it is very 
difficult to know if the share was higher than in the wider population, particularly at times of 
plague. As Bellavitis found before, the share of apprentices with deceased fathers differed by 
the gender of the apprentice. In the last decades of the sixteenth century, 56% of girls had 
deceased fathers, but less than 40% of boys. This strongly suggests that apprenticeship was 
chosen as a last resort in the case of girls, but was a normal way to enter work for boys 
(Bellavitis, 2006). Even though our data excludes the textile sector, the main one employing 
girls, more than one apprentice in three had lost their father. The proportion is 55% if we 
consider the eleven female apprentices in our sample. Most notably, a higher proportion of 
foreigners had their father deceased than Venetians, for reasons yet to investigate. The drop in 
the proportion of orphans during the mid-sixteenth century might be due to the recovery 
through immigration after the plague. 
Virtually every contract required the presence of one or more guarantors for the 
apprentice. For the most part, the guarantor was the father, or a male close relative, more rarely 
it was the widowed mother. Sometimes, the guarantor could be a social broker of sorts. The 
guarantor might be a master from the same profession, or a representative of a local community 
of immigrants, long-established in Venice, but still helping newcomers to establish themselves. 
This happened in the not-uncommon case of a pastry maker, Cristofolo Galas from the Grisons, 
who stood as guarantor for several apprentices from the same place who apprenticed in printing 
over a period of a few days in late October 1582.19 Notably, women were guarantors in 302 
contracts (5%), which testifies to the fact that women were able to take the role of tutor in the 
Venetian legal system (Bellavitis, 2008). 
Our data only contain a very limited number of female apprentices, thus no further 
discussion on female apprenticeships is possible at this stage. However, the powerful way 
gender affected apprenticeship has been recently explored through a sample of one thousand 
contracts from the end of the sixteenth century. Only 7 percent of the apprentices were girls, 
mostly in textile crafts, retail and domestic service. The length of their contracts was extremely 
variable: apprenticeship in wool weaving could last from two to seven years; in silk weaving 
from six to eight; in sewing from two to eight. In some cases, these differences depended on 
the age of the apprentice, but this was not always the case. While boys were mostly apprenticed 
at the age of fourteen, girls started at a wider range of ages. Some, mostly in knitting or sewing, 
																																								 																				
19 See ASVe, GV, Accordi dei Garzoni, b. 112, r. 152, 97r-v. 
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were very young, often four to six years old: they did not lodge with their masters or mistresses 
but returned home every night. A wage was usually paid at the end of these contracts, mostly 
in money, but in some cases in goods (Bellavitis, 2006 and 2012). 
A crucial issue for our understanding of apprenticeships is the rate of completion. Given 
the position of Venice as the capital and main economic and political hub of the state, not to 
mention its consistently high demand for immigrants to sustain its population, it is also 
important to see how apprentices’ origins affected their behaviour. The practice of switching 
masters, or interrupting a contract and registering a new one at a subsequent time, was relatively 
uncommon in Venice, at least for what we now know (Colavizza, 2017). Contracts could 
instead end prematurely in two ways: with the mutual consent of both parties, or on the 
initiative of one side. In the former case, the master and the apprentice asked to the Giustizia 
Vecchia to cancel the agreement and this registration usually concludes with the statement 
“they	declare themselves satisfied and pleased”. The proportion of contracts that ended by 
mutual agreement has been estimated by previous studies to be low, likely under 10% 
(MacKenney 1997, pp. 37-38).  Similarly, the number of contracts that ended by a court 
decision was likely negligible due to the costs involved for legal action.  
In Table 2, we report the proportions of apprentices declared as ran away in the registers 
of the Giustizia Vecchia. We distinguish between Venetian and foreign apprentices. Clearly, 
on this evidence, only a small proportion of apprentices, around 11 percent, ran away early. 
The share running away decreased over time among both Venetians and foreigners alike, yet 
Venetians were consistently less likely to run away than foreigners. Possibly, some foreign 
apprentices went to Venice to receive training, and then returned to their homeland to work, 
giving them little interest in official recognition by the city’s guilds.  
 
Table 2: The proportion of early interruptions because the apprentice ran away. “r.w.” stands 
for declared as ran away. 
 All 1582-1598 1621-1633 1640-1665 
Apprentice r.w. 10.8% 14% 12.6% 7% 
Venetians r.w. 8.4% 12.6% 8% 5.2% 
Foreigners r.w. 12.5% 14.8% 16.4% 7.9% 
 
These figures are based on the apprenticeship registrations at the Giustizia Vecchia, 
where an interruption of any kind discussed above could be registered in the margins beside a 
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contract. Nevertheless, interruptions were likely to be systematically recorded only when the 
apprentice was declared as ran away. In these cases, the only proof a master could offer in 
support of his intent to register a new apprentice, and at the same time respect the cap on 
apprentice numbers imposed by guild regulations, was this kind of evidence of having 
abandoned a previous contract.  
 
2.2 Paying for Opportunity 
 
One important aspect of apprenticeship in Venice was the degree of freedom to 
negotiate payments between parties. Compensation were given to either the apprentice or the 
master (no contract mentions both receiving payments), during or upon completion of the 
apprenticeship. There was no concept of a premium paid in advance to the master, or at least 
none were recorded, although premiums were paid in several other Italian cities. This flexibility 
allowed masters and apprentices to balance the supply and demand for training. Colavizza 
suggests that, as a result, apprenticeship in Venice followed a ‘double-track’ system (Colavizza 
2017). On the one hand, large numbers of contracts involved the apprentice receiving a regular 
wage or end-of-term payment. In these, the amount of (skilled and unskilled) work required of 
the apprentice likely surpassed the time spent on training. The presence of working contracts 
masked as apprenticeships has been already noted in the literature, in situations were no 
previous training was to be assumed for the apprentice, yet an apprenticeship was still used as 
contractual form (Martini and Bellavitis 2014). This is a slow track into the occupation, in 
which paid apprentices accepted conditions entailing less intense training and extra work, in 
exchange for higher wages. On the other hand, another smaller group of contracts included no 
wage or payoff for the apprentice, or even required payments to the master during or after the 
apprenticeship. These contracts gave more emphasis on training, and perhaps the apprentice’s 
good positioning for a future entry in the regulated craft, effectively offering a fast track into 
the occupation.  
This double-track system can only work in the presence of a flexible institution able to 
accommodate such different agreements. It allowed the relatively closed Venetian guild system 
to attract a workforce that met the requirements of different crafts, and to accommodate to 
exceptional situations or periods of crisis. At the same time, the two tracks should not be taken 
as creating a binary division over contracts of apprenticeship, but more reasonably as two polar 
and mostly theoretical opposites, present in most contracts with different degrees of intensity 
resulting in a variety of different tracks. In this respect the system can fit a standard model of 
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apprenticeship as proposed by Hamilton (1996) and Minns and Wallis (2013), with the main 
trade-off for the apprentice being between work and training intensity. We do consider work 
to be possibly skilled and unskilled, and to have in Venice extremes such as labour contracts 
in all respects, thus entailing no training, under the form of an apprenticeship (this would be 
the slowest track possible). In this respect the wage is perhaps the most discriminating 
bargaining option, which we then compare with the age of entry, the length of contracts and 
the provenance of apprentices in order to further motivate the double track system.  
The most common practice for an apprentice in Venice was to be rewarded by their 
master for their work at the end of their contract, usually with a sum of money, or goods of an 
equivalent value. Most end-of-term payments were relatively small, but not negligible 
amounts. As Table 3 shows, 74% of apprentices in our sample received an end-of-term 
payment. On average, they received 5 Venetian ducats for each year they served: 25 ducats in 
total given the average length of contracts of five years. As in Florence, these were almost 
token payments, if compared to the wages received by other workers, yet in most cases they 
were an extra given on top of food and shelter.20 The size of end-of-term payments was 
relatively stable over time, even if perceptible differences existed that depended on the craft, 
the age of the apprentice and the length of the contract. These final payments can be considered 
as both an incentive to complete the contract, and compensation for the work done by the 
apprentice. Cases where this payment was in practice used, at least in part, to cover personal 
expenses, such as clothes and materials or tools, can also be imagined. The proportion of 
apprentices receiving this sort of final compensation nevertheless marks a clear regularity in 
Venetian apprenticeships. 
Outside of this case, three other regimes applied. Sixteen per cent of apprentices were 
to receive no payment of any kind, nor their masters. This sort of agreement becomes 
increasingly common over time. The lack of a final payment is perhaps less of a discontinuity 
and identifies contracts where an incentive to keep the apprentice in place was not deemed as 
needed. The other two regimes are more distinctive, and represent two extremes in the double-
track system view: in one, apprentices received a regular wage in contracts which can be taken 
to be equivalent to regular employment (very slow track); in the other, a payment is instead 
given to the master (fastest track). 
In the first case, the average wage was substantially higher than most end-of-term 
payments. Wages which rise over time—usually increases occurred every one or two years—
																																								 																				
20 For comparisons, see Zannini, 1999. 
20	
	
are only common during the late sixteenth century, and were afterwards mostly replaced with 
stable wages. We consider these payments to be almost salaries because, despite not being as 
high as those paid to journeymen under similar conditions (living-in), they were made in yearly, 
half-yearly, monthly, sometimes even weekly instalments, and they were not increasing over 
time—which would imply that the apprentice was being compensated for their improved 
capacity due to training. Regular wages of this kind could also be the result of unregistered, 
pre-contract training which took place during a period of assessment of the apprentice, prior to 
formal registration, and which might lead to a better deal being given to apprentices who were 
in fact already partly trained. This possibility remains to be investigated. 
In the second case, when payments were made to the master, it is striking that 
substantially higher amounts were paid, on average 16 ducats for each year of contract. These 
payments were made by the apprentice’s parents or close relatives. Several times, contracts 
specify that the payment to be a compensation for the cost of hosting and training the 
apprentice, at times even detailing how the training was broadly to unfold. For example, 
Colavizza (2017) discusses the case of an apothecary apprentice who paid (or the family for 
him) decreasing amounts of money to his master to guarantee his training, and was supposed 
to be sent to school to learn how to read and write during his first year of apprenticeship. 
 
Table 3: The distribution of payments and their amounts.21 
 All 1582-1598 1621-1633 1640-1665 
Payment to 
apprentice from 
master 
4,893 (82%) 2,074 (84%) 884 (80%) 1,935 (81%) 
One final 
instalment 
4,393 (90.5%) 1,867 (90.8%) 771 (87.5%) 1,755 (91.6%) 
Average (median) 
amount in ducats 
5.1 (4) 4.4 (3.3) 5.1 (4) 5.9 (5) 
Regular wage 320 (6.6%) 83 (4%) 94 (10.6%) 143 (7.5%) 
Average (median) 
amount in ducats 
10 (6) 13 (6) 8 (6) 9.7 (6) 
Incremental wage 139 (2.9%) 105 (5.1%) 17 (1.9%) 17 (0.9%) 
																																								 																				
21 Most contracts entail a final payment to the apprentice, some instead provide regular payments in the form of a 
wage, to be paid at yearly, half-yearly, monthly instalments (under regular wage). Some contracts also specify a 
rising wage over time (under incremental wage). We always normalise by considering the equivalent annual 
average or median over the whole contract. 
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Average (median) 
amount in ducats 
8 (6.3) 7.8 (6) 6.1 (6) 10.9 (8) 
No payment 873 (15%) 333 (13%) 169 (15%) 371 (15%) 
Payment to master 196 (3%) 67 (3%) 46 (4%) 83 (3%) 
Average (median) 
amount in ducats 
18.4 (15) 15 (10) 17.7 (14.5) 21.5 (20) 
 
The distribution of average annual payments, given in Figure 6, highlights the variety 
of tracks available to Venetian apprentices. The payment is turned negative if it was given to 
the apprentice, as to highlight a master’s gains in this specific respect. Long tails on both sides 
represent the very slow and fast tracks (negative and positive respectively), whilst the bulk of 
contracts fit a more common situation where a small payment or no payment was given to the 
apprentice. 
 
Figure 6: The distribution of payments from the master’s perspective. All payments to the 
apprentices are turned negative. We consider average annual payments. The plot is trimmed at 
plus and minus 100 ducats. 
 
 
Payments between masters and apprentices need to be understood in the context of other 
elements of apprenticeship. Most important were the accommodation, clothes and other 
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expenses, and care provided to the apprentice, such as in the case of illness. Very rarely, some 
contracts also involved the exchange of securities, given in kind or money to the master. 
Masters were usually expected to provide accommodation for their apprentices, who typically 
lived with them, and supply food and other basic needs. The apprentice was, however, often 
supposed to provide for their own clothes (cf. Table 1). More complex arrangements do appear, 
for example when special and costly tools were needed, but were much less common.  
The impact of other contextual factors is clear from our data. Younger apprentices were less 
likely to receive a payment, implying that they were less useful, or less in need of incentives, 
and perhaps more likely to need training: 88% of apprentices aged over fifteen received a 
payment during or after their term; this drops to 78% for apprentices younger than thirteen 
years.  Shorter contracts of older apprentices were also linked with a higher wage, further 
hinting at the possible use of some apprentices as workforce. Both trends are highlighted in 
Figure 7. Furthermore, conditions differed between Venetians and foreigners. Table 4 reports 
the proportion of each group whose contracts involved a payment to the apprentice from their 
master. This was lower among Venetian apprentices, which might reflect their preferential 
access to regulated occupations in the city, or that Venetians were less likely to run away during 
their term, which could mean that masters felt less need to provide them with an incentive to 
finish their term. Payment differences are also visible between apprentices who had lost their 
fathers and those who had not. Of the apprentices who had lost their fathers only 45% received 
a payment from their master, compared 55% of non orphans, suggesting they had somewhat 
weaker bargaining power. The lower average wages received by apprentices represented by a 
woman as guarantor is a further indicator of the similar situation. 
 
Table 4: The share of apprentices receiving payments from their masters, by origin.  
 All 1582-1598 1621-1633 1640-1665 
All 82% 83.8% 80.4% 81% 
Venetians 78.5% 79.6% 79.2% 77.2% 
Foreigners 84.5% 86% 81.4% 84.1% 
  
Figure 7: Scatter plot of the average annual wage vs the age at entry and length of contract. 
Younger apprentices staying for long got less. We only consider wages paid to apprentices by 
their masters, and trim to consider only apprentices younger than 25 years. 
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The following trade-offs emerge as partial explanations for the mechanics of the 
contracts of apprenticeship in Venice: a) higher wages to the apprentice likely signify less 
intense training, payments to the master entail instead more intense training; b) shorter 
contracts, especially below guild regulations, entail higher wages as compensation; c) younger 
apprentices received lower wages as they were less physically fit and required longer to become 
trained (in the absence of systematic previous training); d) less well represented apprentices 
received lower wages (father deceased, woman as guarantor); e) apprentices less likely to quit 
received lower wages; f) other contractual conditions should impact wages, e.g. reducing them 
if the apprentice was given accommodation by the master. Points a) and b) are particularly 
relevant for the double track system, and the possible use of apprenticeships in order to hire 
workforce, or anyway balance work and training intensity. The rest are part of a relatively 
standard model of apprenticeship. We provide results of an OLS regression in Table 6, where 
the average annual wage is regressed upon a set of predictor variables. We refer to the second 
model from Table 6, calculated after trimming outliers out, even if both models (with and 
without outliers) provide coherent results. Notably, we just consider wages or payments given 
to the apprentice by the master, thus point a) can only be discussed indirectly. Several results 
confirm the trade-offs just discussed. The length of the contract is negatively correlated to the 
wage, the age of the apprentice is positively correlated instead: older apprentices staying for 
less time under contract were paid on average more, meaning their bargaining interest lay in 
the wage to a considerable extent, especially so if the contract was below minimum length 
5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
80
Wage vs Age
Age (years)
Av
g.
 A
nn
ua
l W
ag
e
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
20
40
60
80
Wage vs Length
Length (years)
24	
	
requirements. The magnitude of the effect of contract length is sensibly higher than 
apprentice’s age in this respect. Wages were also lower if the apprentice was having extra 
benefits such as accommodation and generic expenses paid by the master. In some cases, when 
regular or incremental salaries were paid, the wage was usually higher: these contracts might 
represent a rare win-win situation were initial training and subsequent compensation were 
given in order to retain the skilled apprentice until completion. Incremental salaries do show a 
particularly strong effect, to be balanced with their rarity (cf. Table 3). We cannot see 
conclusively that less well represented apprentices were discriminated, at least with respect to 
orphans. Female apprentices and guarantors are so few that any result in this respect is 
essentially inconclusive. Venetians were not discriminated nor favoured if they received a 
wage or payment, yet we know they were less likely to be in this category in the first place (cf. 
Table 4). 
In conclusion, Venetian apprentices closely followed regulations and fitted well with 
standard models of apprenticeship in terms of trade-offs between the need for training and for 
a compensation to the master for the risks involved. Furthermore, apprenticeships in Venice 
were also likely used to accommodate working contracts, either with previous training or not, 
in order to flexibly hire cheap workforce in times of need. Some apprentices were able to pay 
for more intense training and privileged conditions.  
 
Part 3. Case Studies: Goldsmiths, Carpenters and Printers 
 
In order to delve deeper into the practical use of apprenticeship, we now compare five trades, 
spanning three activity sectors over their respective guilds: goldsmiths, a luxury, high-value 
trade; carpenters, both general carpenters and furniture builders; and printers, both typesetters 
and press workers. Summary statistics for the three sectors can be found in the Appendix (Table 
5). These three trades were chosen for two main reasons. First, they represent some of the 
numerically largest guilds in the sample. Mirror makers and mercers, two other guilds with a 
substantial number of apprentices, were not considered because of the former’s relative novelty 
and growth during this period, and the overly varied composition of the latter guild. Second, 
the three activities represent different markets and systems of production. Carpenters produced 
a variety of goods with both high and low value, and could assist in other manufacturing 
activities as well. Goldsmiths were specialised in luxury objects, such as jewelry, where the 
market was smaller, but of higher value, and the skills of the worker were likely to be higher 
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on average. Lastly, print shops produced very specific goods through a relatively well-defined 
division of labour between typesetters and press workers (plus more episodic activities such as 
proof reading). As a result, the three sectors are both large enough to analyse and representative 
of somewhat different markets, commodities, amount of training and capital involved, and 
workshop organisation. 
	
Goldsmiths 
The guild of Goldsmiths had been established 1233. According to their statute, in order 
to become a full member of the guild, a Venetian artisan had to work for a master for 7 years 
and pay a fee of 3 ducats; while artisans from the mainland and foreign goldsmiths were obliged 
to pay an entry fee of 15 ducats.22	
Unlike Carpenters, the Goldsmiths never organised themselves into specializations. In 
Paris, the high level of fees paid by goldsmith apprentices’ families (200-300 livres) led to a 
marked socio-economic bias. Moreover, apprentices received different types of training: some 
only learned to read and write, others had a more complete artistic education, a few were sent 
abroad (Bimbenet-Privat 1992). The high share (73%) of local apprentices among Venetian 
goldsmiths likewise suggests an element of selection based on their geographical origins and a 
pattern of endogamous reproduction within the guild. 
Apprentices were thirteen on average, younger than the norm, and faced 
apprenticeships lasting five years, around the median for the city, which if we also consider the 
period served afterwards, as a journeyman, normally met the guild’s regulations. An unusually 
high proportion of contracts did not mention payments from the master to the apprentice (31%), 
and relatively few had lost their fathers (25%). Furthermore, Venetians supplied an 
overwhelming majority of apprentices: 73% on average, increasing to 81% by the 1640s to 
1660s. Probably as a consequence of this, relatively few apprentices were denounced as having 
ran away. If interruptions reflected a disregard for a working future in Venice, then this also 
suggests that goldsmiths were a relatively closed guild, with an intangible high-barrier for 
foreigners to join. As such, the high proportions of contracts in the fast-track, thus without any 
payment given to the apprentice, might either be motivated by the desire to guarantee training 
or simply by the reduced need to provide an incentive to complete the contract. 
 
																																								 																				
22 Biblioteca del Museo Correr, Manoscritti, Classe IV, n. 139. 
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Carpenters 
The guild of Carpenters has been founded during the 14th century according to the first 
version of its statute.23 They were divided in the guild into four groups (colonelli) at least by 
the 16th century according to the products they made (e.g. furniture, frames, building). The 
contracts, however, present several different specializations. The two we consider here, the 
carpenters, a generic group, and furniture makers, a more focused specialization, were 
numerous. At the end of a minimum of five-year training period, an apprentice became a 
lavorante (“worker” or journeyman), conditional on enrolling in the guild within six months 
without taking an exam. An exception to this norm was provided for sons of masters, which at 
the age of 18 y.o. had just to record themselves as masters and pay an entry fee. Most lavoranti 
chose to prepare for the specialization of carpenter, for which the mastership exam was likely 
easier, and, once passed, they could choose to exercise in any specialisation within the craft. 
Likely the most dangerous consequence was that several masters reached only low quality 
levels (Caniato and Dal Borgo, 1990). The exam consisted in the construction of a square and 
a round door and a framework. The relative high share of apprentices who ran away (15%) 
reflects one of the major problems for this guild: the apprentices who ran away worked for 
other masters and formed an informal labour market out of the control of the authority. In the 
eighteenth century, according to the Inquisitori alle Arti24, many apprentices ran away after 
two years of training; this suggests that the time needed to acquire the basic skills of the craft 
was shorter than the period required by the guild. This raises another question: when an 
apprentice did not complete his contract, how was he able to work in an what is usually seen 
as a highly regulated corporative economy? Possibly, these runaway apprentices worked for 
other masters in a parallel “black” labour market, or they moved out of Venice. 
The variety of specializations of apprentices in carpentry increased over time. During 
the last period, of 167 carpenters’ apprentices, 49 specialized in mirror frames, 37 in veneering, 
28 in wooden chests, 10 in walnut-wood furniture, and 7 were “carpenters for building”, as 
well as a few other specializations. General ‘carpenters’ accounted for only half of contracts; 
the proportion had been nearly four-fifths during the late sixteenth century. Apprentices in 
carpentry were slightly older (14.5 years) than the overall average, and usually served longer 
than the guild required. Most masters offered a modest payment on completion to their 
apprentice. One apprentice in four was Venetian, and there was no obvious difference between 
																																								 																				
23 Biblioteca del Museo Correr, Manoscritti, Classe IV, n. 152. 
24 ASVe, IA, b. 58, Scrittura 3, September 1752 and Scrittura 5, May 1753. 
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the treatment of locals and foreigners. Interestingly, the proportion of Venetians was not equal 
across specializations: among the furniture makers, locals supplied 36% of apprentices. Aside 
from this, contractual terms did not vary much between specializations. Finally, the ratio of 
apprentices who were denounced as fled is just above average (15%). 
In the Carpenters guild thus apprentices possibly had a greater importance as a source 
of skilled and unskilled labour. The wage or final payment given to the apprentice in the large 
majority of contracts suggests that apprentices needed a further incentive to complete their 
period and contributed significantly to the productivity of their masters’ workshops while they 
were training.  
 
Printers 
The guild of Booksellers and Printers, the Università de librai e stampatori, was 
officially established by the Council of Ten in 1548-49, as part of an effort to control the sector 
through censorship and workshop regulation. The first surviving statutes (mariegola) were only 
given later, in 1567 (Brown, 1891, pp. 81-3, 243-48). The earliest known legislation on printing 
dated from 1517, however, and attempted to bring order to the early system of privileges. 
Venice’s early legislation on printing was simply a reordering of precedents created by the 
decisions of several magistracies that had often crystallized in practice (Brown 1891, pp. 71-
4). Some kind of organization of printers also existed well before 1548, based on the 
confraternities (Dondi, 2004). The fact that the formal establishment of a guild took so long 
bears witness to the effectiveness of this earlier system. In 1572, the guild regulated its 
admission procedures, requiring new masters to serve a five-year apprenticeship, properly 
registered at the Giustizia Vecchia, followed by three years as a journeyman: “he shall then be 
examined by experts named by the prior and officers of the guild, and, if found able, he shall, 
on the payment of five ducats, receive matriculation”. Foreigners needed to work for five years 
in the city before taking the exam; their fee was ten ducats. Sons of master paid nothing (Brown 
1891, p. 88). No further regulations were introduced, at least before the second half of the 
eighteenth century, when several attempts at reform and regulation took place. For example, in 
1767, the Riformatori allo Studio di Padova, responsible for the regulation of the sector, 
enforced a joint limitation of one apprentice per master and a ban of fifteen years for new 
apprentices in an attempt to recover the long-past quality in the activity. It is difficult to gauge 
whether the guild included all the active printers and booksellers in Venice. Likely not. There 
is evidence of 125 to 150 presses in Venice at the end of the sixteenth century, when the guild 
had 75 members at most (Brown, 1891, p. 91): if so, a non-trivial share of printers might not 
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have been members. A normal printing shop was usually a relatively small enterprise at a time. 
If we take early seventeenth-century London, the average printer might have two or three 
presses, with a couple of journeymen and an apprentice (Weedon, 2013, p. 155). In Venice, the 
number of smaller shops or masters without a press was likely large at all times, while the 
number of active presses dropped sharply during the seventeenth century, down to 20 or little 
more in 1660.25 
Printers apprentices were consistently divided into one of three groups in their 
contracts: press workers (“torcoleri”), typesetters (“compositori”), and general printers 
(“stampatori”). In general, printing apprentices were slightly older (14.5 years) than average, 
entered contracts of average length of five years, as requested by regulations, and nearly all 
(96%) received a wage or final payment from their master, which is above average. Both the 
share with deceased fathers, and the share who fled were around average. More interestingly, 
the distribution of Venetians across the three specializations was not even:  press workers 
included few Venetians (14%), typesetters fell in the middle (25%), while many general 
printers were Venetians (55%). The explanation for this is uncertain. However, we do know 
that press workers encompassed men involved in two specializations: the “battitore” inked and 
changed sheets, and the “tiratore” operated the press. Their work was repetitive and fatiguing. 
The two roles involved different levels of skill, and “tiratori” were usually paid more than 
“battitori”, sometimes even more than typesetters (Richardson, 2004, pp. 34-5). In our sample 
“tiratori” were on average older, enduring shorter contracts and were paid more, typesetters 
were younger, endured longer contracts and were paid less, whilst generic “stampatori” fell in 
the middle. It is not clear whether the “torcoleri” registered in the Giustizia Vecchia included 
both “battitori” and “tiratori”, not why Venetians were usually registered as “stampatori”: it is 
possible, though, that several apprentices to the better paid “tiratori” specialization were 
following a slow track, as this would explain their contractual conditions as well as they being 
usually foreigners. 
The printing press seems to be representative of an activity with simple but clear 
division of labour among differently specialized apprentices—in this case workers at the press 
and typesetters. This activity is characterised by having a unique output, divided in a limited 
set of mechanized production steps, which allows for specialization and production 
streamlining, also represented by the choice of apprentices with specific characteristics for any 
given specialization. Overall, typesetters are similar to goldsmiths and perhaps carpenters in 
																																								 																				
25 ASVe, Arti, b.164, Atti V, cc. 8v-9r.	
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that they have a high-skill task to learn, while workers at the press could learn their job more 
rapidly, and thus are paid more from the very beginning. 
 
In summary, we find strong similarities and only some specificities for the three sectors 
of activity under investigation. Apprenticeship was generally used within the bounds of 
regulations, with most apprentices enduring contracts of sufficient length to proceed to further 
steps into the guild. Some important characteristics of specific guilds and their trades emerge. 
Goldsmiths stand out as a strongly Venetian guild, where a larger share of apprentices did not 
necessitate the incentive of a payment to complete their contract, and were more likely to 
proceed with a fast track. Carpenters and Printing press workers were instead more similar with 
respect to providing a basic payment to apprentices in the large majority of cases, and only 
very rarely use contracts in a fast track. Compositors and workers at the press further highlight 
how different trades, also within the same guild, adapted contractual conditions to the profile 
of the apprentices they needed. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Apprenticeship in Venice was only one of the ways in which vocational training could 
be provided. Artisans’ children usually trained in their father’s workshop, while charitable 
institutions offered important sources for training in some trades. Nevertheless, both the 
Republican state and the guilds put much effort into regulating it. The state was interested in 
keeping an eye on guilds and securing the economic development of the city, while the guilds 
were interested in apprenticeship for a variety of reasons that depended on their craft’s needs 
and their reaction to critical moments such as the seventeenth-century crisis. For goldsmiths, 
carpenters and printers, we have highlighted how trades attracted different profiles of 
apprentices, varied the incentives they provided, and differed in their openness to foreign 
workers. Apprenticeship also changed over time, as Venice’s role in its subject territories 
shifted. As the city lost the central economic position it had enjoyed until the sixteenth century, 
the reactions of the state and the guilds diverged, one pushing for reform, the others calling for 
protectionism. 
Apprenticeship in early modern Venice had some strong regularities in terms of the age 
of entry (average 14 years), the length of contracts (average 5 years) and those elements which 
could be used to accommodate real situations, especially the payments given to either master 
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or apprentice. We suggest that a double-track system might have existed, reflecting different 
points of balance between training and working. At one end, more work was likely demanded 
from an apprentice receiving a wage or end-of-term payment, and their training was less intense 
if compared to that expected from an apprentice who did not receive a payment, or whose 
master was being paid in turn. Such a system, previously identified to be in operation during 
period of economic crisis, may have been a normal component of apprenticeship in Venice. 
Indeed, despite its changes and adaptations, the main feature of Venetian apprenticeship was 
its high degree of flexibility, a characteristic shared with other cities in the Italian peninsula. 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Summary statistics for the three sectors of activity under comparison: carpenters (C), 
goldsmiths (G) and printing press workers (P).  
Period All 1582-1598 1621-1633 1640-1665 
Sector C G P C G P C G P C G P 
Number of 
contracts 
736 634 261 311 224 214 119 159 13 307 255 34 
Age (A/M) 
14.5/1
4 
13.5/1
3 
14.5/1
4 
14.6/1
4 
13.6/1
4 
15/14 15/15 
13.2/1
4 
12.6/1
2 
14.2/1
4 
13.6/1
3 
13/13 
Median 
contract 
length 
6 (min 
1. max 
8) 
5 (min 
1. max 
10) 
5 (min 
1. max 
10) 
6 (min 
1. max 
8) 
5 (min 
1. max 
9) 
5 (min 
1. 
max 
10) 
6 (min 
2. 
max 
8) 
5 (min 
1. max 
8) 
6 (min 
3. max 
8) 
6 (min 
1. max 
8) 
5 (min 
1. max 
10) 
5 (min 
2. max 
7) 
Contracts 
wPM 
685 
(93%) 
440 
(69%) 
251 
(96%) 
300 
(96%) 
148 
(66%) 
210 
(98%) 
105 
(88%) 
123 
(77%) 
10 
(77%) 
280 
(91%) 
169 
(66%) 
31 
(91%) 
Payment 
from master 
(A/M) 
3.6/3 6/3 4.9/4 3.4/3 6/2.6 4.8/4 3.2/3 4/3 3.7/3 4/3.3 7.4/4 5.7/5 
Contracts 
with a 
payment to 
the master 
4 
(0.5%) 
47 
(7.4%) 
2 
(0.8%) 
1 
(0.3%) 
19 
(8.5%) 
0 
1 
(0.8%
) 
10 
(6.3%) 
2 
(15%) 
2 
(0.6%) 
18 
(7%) 
0 
Contracts 
with no 
payment 
48 
(6.5%) 
151 
(24%) 
8 (3%) 
10 
(3.2%) 
57 
(25%) 
4 
(2%) 
13 
(11%) 
26 
(16%) 
1 (8%) 
25 
(8.1%) 
68 
(27%) 
3 (9%) 
Venetians 
191 
(26%) 
464 
(73%) 
76 
(29%) 
63 
(20%) 
129 
(58%) 
47 
(22%) 
29 
(24%) 
129 
(81%) 
6 
(46%) 
99 
(32%) 
206 
(81%) 
23 
(68%) 
Venetians 
wPM 
176 
(26%) 
337 
(77%) 
72 
(29%) 
59 
(20%) 
89 
(60%) 
47 
(22%) 
26 
(25%) 
105 
(85%) 
5 (5%) 
91 
(32%) 
143 
(85%) 
20 
(64%) 
Early 
interruption
s 
(apprentice 
ran away) 
108 
(15%) 
28 
(4%) 
45 
(17%) 
60 
(19%) 
15 
(7%) 
38 
(18%) 
20 
(17%) 
8 (5%) 
2 
(15%) 
28 
(9%) 
5 (2%) 5 (15%) 
Father 
deceased 
289 
(39%) 
163 
(25%) 
108 
(41%) 
133 
(43%) 
55 
(24%) 
98 
(44%) 
63 
(53%) 
40 
(25%) 
0 
93 
(30%) 
68 
(27%) 
14 
(41%) 
Female 
apprentices 
0 0 
3 
(1.1%) 
0 0 
2 
(0.9%
) 
0 0 0 0 0 1 (3%) 
Female 
guarantors 
20 
(2.7%) 
42 
(7%) 
9 
(3.4%) 
11 
(3.5%) 
17 
(8%) 
5 
(2.3%
) 
6 
(5%) 
11 
(7%) 
2 
(15%) 
3 (1%) 
14 
(5%) 
2 (6%) 
Note: Payments are expressed in average venetian ducats per year of contract, ages and lengths in 
years. When raw numbers are provided, the relative proportion over the relevant population is given in 
parentheses, unless otherwise specified. For example, Venetians wPM provides the number of Venetians 
with a payment from their master, in parentheses their proportion over the number of apprentices who 
received similar payments. Legend: wPM: with payment from master, A/M average/median. 
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Table 6: OLS regressions on the determinants of the payments given to apprentices.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Average annual wage 
 (1) (2) 
 
Venetian (yes = 1) -0.028 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
   
Year 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
   
Length of contract -0.194*** -0.125*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
   
Age of apprentice 0.034*** 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Orphan by father (yes = 1) 0.010 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.016) 
   
Apprentice fled (yes = 1) 0.010 0.025 
 (0.021) (0.018) 
   
Accommodation (paid by master 
= 1) -0.125
** -0.161*** 
 (0.050) (0.046) 
   
Personal care (paid by master = 1) -0.030 0.048* 
 (0.032) (0.029) 
   
Clothes (paid by master = 1) 0.001 -0.0001 
 (0.018) (0.016) 
   
Generic expenses (paid by master 
= 1) -0.078
* -0.044 
 (0.045) (0.041) 
   
Female guarantor (present = 1) -0.037 -0.020 
 (0.032) (0.028) 
   
Gender of apprentice (male = 1) 0.052 -0.061 
 (0.137) (0.122) 
   
Gender of master (male = 1) -0.037 -0.034 
 (0.073) (0.069) 
   
Periodization of salary (one final 
instalment = 1) -0.356
*** -0.117*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) 
   
Incremental salary (yes = 1) 0.189*** 0.383*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) 
   
Venetian orphan by father (yes = 
1) 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.029) (0.026) 
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Constant -3.627*** -4.676*** 
 (0.405) (0.364) 
   
 
Observations 4,533 4,010 
R2 0.423 0.306 
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.303 
Residual Std. Error 0.446 (df = 4516) 0.378 (df = 3993) 
F Statistic 206.689*** (df = 16; 4516) 109.841*** (df = 16; 3993) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Note: The payment is taken to be the annual average irrespective on how it was supposed to be paid (if 
every month, six months, year, at the end of the contract, or other arrangement. The robust standard 
error is given in parentheses after coefficients, while conventional significance level is given via 
asterisks. Two models are fitted, model 1 on all data, model 2 on data after trimming outliers. Outlier 
conditions, detected using Cook’s distance, have been minimised removing all contracts with: an annual 
salary above 10 ducats a year included; an apprentice younger than 5 or older than 20 years old; a 
length below 1 and above 10 years. As a result, model 2 passed all standard diagnostics for OLS. In 
model 1 both the dependent average annual salary and the length of contracts are skewed and could 
benefit from a log transform, yet we maintained the original values for comparison with model 2, where 
transformations are not warranted (by Box-Cox and Box-Tidwell tests). 
 
Table 7: The list of trades considered in this study. The first column gives the number of 
contracts for the specific occupation, the third column identifies the guild the trade belonged 
to. 
Contrac
ts 
Trade Trade Arte Guild 
249 tiraoro  gold-thread maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
106 battioro  gold-leaf maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
8 battiargento  silver-leaf maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
1 battifoglio al bagno di colori  tin-leaf maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
1 battioro e battiargento  gold and silver-leaf maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
1 filaoro  gold-thread maker battioro, stagnoli e colori gold, silver, and tin-leaf 
makers 
71 cartaio  papermaker carteri papermakers 
1 cartaio - diverse 
specializzazioni  
papermaker - specializations carteri papermakers 
6 coronaio - diverse 
specializzazioni  
prayer beads maker - 
specialization 
coroneri prayer beads makers 
130 cuoridoro  golden leather decorator dipintori painters 
104 indoratore  gilder dipintori painters 
74 pittore  painter dipintori painters 
63 decoratore  decorator dipintori painters 
48 disegnatore  drawer / draftsman dipintori painters 
38 miniador  miniaturist dipintori painters 
12 mascheraio  mask makers dipintori painters 
5 madonnaio  painter - specializations dipintori painters 
3 fabbricatore di scudi  golden leather decorator dipintori painters 
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3 pittore - diverse 
specializzazioni  
painter - specializations dipintori painters 
1 miniatore da santi  miniaturist - specialization dipintori painters 
1 miniatore da specchi  miniaturist - specialization dipintori painters 
1 miniatore da vetro  miniaturist - specialization dipintori painters 
69 intagliatore  carver intagliatori carvers 
23 intagliatore di legno  wood carver intagliatori carvers 
11 intagliatore di pietra  stone carver intagliatori carvers 
2 intagliatore di rame  copper engraver intagliatori carvers 
124 compositore  typesetter libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
121 libraio  bookseller libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
85 torcolaio  pressman libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
52 stampatore  printer libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
20 fonditore di caratteri da 
stampa  
type-founder libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
20 libraio da carta bianca e 
simili  
bookseller libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
1 libraio da libri e carta bianca  bookseller libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
1 rilegatore di libri  bookbinder libreri, stampatori e ligadori booksellers, printers, and 
bookbinders 
478 falegname - generico  woodman - generic marangoni woodmen 
107 mobiliere - diverse 
specializzazioni  
furniture maker - 
specializations 
marangoni woodmen 
79 mobiliere  furniture maker marangoni woodmen 
48 impiallacciatore  veneerer marangoni woodmen 
12 stipettaio  cabinet maker marangoni woodmen 
8 falegname edile  carpenter marangoni woodmen 
3 falegname - diverse 
specializzazioni  
woodman - specializations marangoni woodmen 
1 corniciaio  frame maker marangoni woodmen 
504 marzer  mercer marzeri merciers 
12 ceraio  wax maker marzeri merciers 
8 biancheggiatore di cera  wax bleacher marzeri merciers 
7 marzer da menudo  mercer marzeri merciers 
6 marzer e telariol  mercer and cloth maker marzeri merciers 
2 marzer da merze milanese  mercer marzeri merciers 
1 bottonaio  button maker marzeri merciers 
1 marzer da sutil  mercer marzeri merciers 
1 marzer de panni da seda  mercer marzeri merciers 
1 marzer e stringher  mercer and lace maker marzeri merciers 
1 merciaio del fontego  mercer marzeri merciers 
1 merzer  mercer marzeri merciers 
318 muratore  bricklayer mureri merciers 
634 orefice  goldsmith orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
52 diamantaio   diamond cutter orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
44 gioielliere  jeweler orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
25 lavorazione dell'ottone  brazier orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
10 intagliatore di rubini e pietre 
dure  
rubin cutter orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
4 orefice - diverse 
specializzazioni  
goldsmith - specializations orefici e gioiellieri goldsmiths and jewelers 
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208 perlaio  lamp beads maker paternosteri e cristalleri bead makers 
63 paternoster  glass beads maker paternosteri e cristalleri bead makers 
54 paternoster - diverse 
specializzazioni  
glass beads maker - 
specializations 
paternosteri e cristalleri bead makers 
13 smalti  enamel paternosteri e cristalleri bead makers 
44 trasportatori di sabbia  sand transporter sabioneri sand transporters 
15 suonatore  player / musician sonadori palyers / musicians 
999 specchiaio  mirrormaker specchieri mirrormakers 
64 fabbricazione/vendita di 
colori  
color maker/seller spezieri spice sellers 
4 speziale e venditore di cere  spice and wax seller spezieri spice sellers 
3 mercante da colori  color seller spezieri spice sellers 
1 macinatore di colori  muller spezieri spice sellers 
153 lavori allo squero  manufacture and 
maintenance of boats 
squeraroli manufacture and 
maintenance of boats 
366 tagliapietra  stonecutter / stonedresser taiapiera stonecutters / stonedressers 
11 segatore  stone saweyer taiapiera stonecutters / stonedressers 
8 scultore  sculptor taiapiera stonecutters / stonedressers 
2 lastricatore  paver terrazeri pavers 
51 tornitore  turner tornidori e bossoleri turners 
5 tornitore da avorio  ivory-turner tornidori e bossoleri turners 
3 tornitore da legno  wood-turner tornidori e bossoleri turners 
31 vetraio  glassmaker verieri di Murano glassmakers of Murano 
1 fonditore di argento  silver founder zecca Mint 
1 fonditore di oro  gold founder zecca Mint 
11 lustratore di seta e lana  silk and wool textile lustrer   
10 liutaio  lutist   
5 cimbalaio  cymbal maker   
4 fabbricatore di arpicordi  harpsichord maker   
2 organista  organist   
2 produttore di anelli falsi  counterfeit rings producer   
2 venditori di oggetti in vetro  glass seller   
1 ballerino  dancer   
1 mosaicista  mosaicist   
 
 
